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Like the rest of American society, die U.S. Catholic Church is currently 
confronting die challenge of formulating a morally correct and politically 
sound policy toward South Africa. This article will discuss the U.S. Catholic 
Church's position on the South Africa issue, and will provide an evaluation 
of this position. In brief, the article argues that, out of a quite understandable 
revulsion against apartheid, the Church has supported policies toward South 
Africa that could produce eitiier civil war or a harshly repressive government 
rather than a multi-racial democratic society in South Africa. It should be 
emphasized that the article deals only with die period prior to de Klerk's 
assumption of power in the summer of 1989. 
The Position of the American Catholic Church 
on South Africa 
In recent decades, me U.S. Cadiolic Church has taken stands on many 
political issues. The Church's bishops have issued pastoral letters on Vietnam 
(1968), on war and peace (1983), and on the economy (1986).1 This tendency 
to get more involved in political issues is characteristic of the Catholic 
Church in otiier countries as well and also of such Christian bodies as the 
World Council of Churches.2 One issue in which the American Cadiolic 
Church has become increasingly involved is Soum Africa. The concern of die 
U.S. Church about Soum Africa flows from a belief that apartheid is immoral 
for the following reasons-
Apartheid is based on racism, and racism is unChristian. A 1985 United 
States Cadiolic Conference "Statement on Soudi Africa" quoted Pope John 
Paul II on racism and apartheid: 
For Christians and for all who believe in a covenant, that 
is, an unbreakable bond between God and man and between 
all human beings, no form of discrimination-in law or in 
fact-on the basis of race, origins, color, culture, sex or 
religion can ever be acceptable. Hence no system of 
apartheid or separate development will ever be acceptable as 
a model for me relations between people or races. (The 
Hague, May 1985).3 
The Church also condemns apartheid because it fosters economic 
inequalities between white and black South Africa. In a 1985 background 
paper on South Africa, die United States Cadiolic Conference had tiiis to say 
about economic conditions in Soutii Africa: 
As a result of die implementation of the laws designed to 
further the system of apartheid, Soutii Africa can be said to 
be botii a *First World country' and a "Third World country'. 
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White South Africa's standard and mode of living is 
comparable to that of western European countries, Canada, 
and the United States. Black South Africa's standard and 
mode of living is comparable to that of some of the poorer 
countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. And it is the 
black South African community that makes possible the 
high standard of living of the white South African 
community.4 
The American Catholic Church further notes that, under apartheid, there 
is a lack of protection of individual rights. Church officials point to the 
Suppression of Communism Act and to the Terrorism Act; both of which 
give the government the right to hold anyone in detention for three months 
without charging them with a crime. During this detention period, detainees 
cannot contact family members or a lawyer; and there is no legal recourse 
against such detention.5 
American Church officials also are critical of the banning practice, 
whereby an individual is ordered to reside in a place designated by the 
government. Banned persons cannot be published or quoted, and their 
movements are restricted. The banning penalty may last as long as five years 
and may be renewed. Again, there is no legal recourse against the banning 
order.6 
Finally, the Church sees South Africa as an undemocratic country. It 
notes that the blacks in South Africa lack voting rights, and the Asians and 
the Coloureds (individuals with a mixed race background) have voting rights 
only for their own special parliamentary chambers. Only white South 
Africans have the full franchise.7 
In contrast, the Church's recommendations about what type of political 
system should replace the current South African system are radier vague. This 
vagueness flows from a belief that the new South African political system 
must be worked out by the South African peopled The Church believes that 
the new South Africa should be racially neutral; that there should no longer 
be any racial restrictions on where people can live and work; and, that die new 
South Africa should be one where there is rule of law. Finally, it insists that 
the new South Africa should have the full social, political and economic 
participation of all of its people and an end to discrimination based on race or 
ethnic origin.9 
If apartheid is immoral and there is a need for a major restructuring of 
South Africa's political, social and economic institutions, the question arises 
as to how this restructuring is to be accomplished. Some Christian churches 
believe that such restructuring can only be accomplished through violent 
revolution, and consequently have endorsed such revolutionary movements as 
the African National Congress (ANC). For example, at an international 
conference in Lusaka, Zambia in May 1987, sponsored by the World Council 
of Churches Program to Combat Racism, a resolution was passed which 
stated: "South Africa's war against its own inhabitants and neighbors compels 
the movements to the use of force, along with other means to end 
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oppression."10 (A number of members of the ANC, including its president, 
Oliver Tambo, were present at this conference.)11 
The U.S. Catholic Church, however, does not endorse armed struggle to 
end apartheid. Instead, its preferred strategy is economic pressure. Thus, it has 
advocated several forms of economic pressure against South Africa: first, a 
prohibition on the importation of South African krugeerrands or other gold 
coins from South Africa; second, a prohibition on loans to the South African 
government (except for loans for any educational, housing, or health facility 
which is available to all persons on a nondiscriminatory basis); third, a 
program of divestment of Church funds from business enterprises doing 
business in South Africa; and finally, if Church officials deem divestment 
unwise, the correct policy is to file shareholder resolutions with portfolio 
corporations doing business in South Africa, requiring them to implement a 
disinvestment program.12 
The stand of the American Catholic Church in favor of sanctions has 
generated considerable controversy and debate. Many people have argued that 
economic sanctions against South Africa will result in victimization of the 
country's black community and setbacks in the peaceful reform process.13 In 
response to these arguments, the Church has made the following case in favor 
of sanctions-
First, it argues that while it is true that blacks will be hurt by sanctions, 
blacks are willing to pay this price to end apartheid. According to Anglican 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu: 
The argument that Blacks would be the first to suffer may 
be true, yet there are at least two rejoinders: a cynical one 
is, when did the Whites become so altruistic? After all, they 
have benefitted from black misery engendered by low 
wages, migratory labour, etc., for so long. The less cynical 
is the Blacks would probably be ready to accept suffering 
that has a goal and a purpose and would therefore end, rather 
than continue to suffer endlessly.14 
The U.S. Catholic Church further argues that economic prosperity will 
not, in and of itself, end apartheid. In a U.S. Church document there was the 
following quotation from Archbishop Tutu: 
Many who are concerned to see fundamental change happen 
in our country peacefully believe that economic prosperity 
will of itself erode apartheid . . . . I wish this were true. 
Unfortunately, contemporary South African history proves 
the opposite. We have experienced several boom periods 
during the 30 years of Nationalist apartheid rule. There has 
been no real liberalization of apartheid. Some of the most 
vicious legislation has come at times not of a recession but 
of a boom.15 
Finally, the U.S. Church acknowledges that sanctions would hurt the 
economies of the black states bordering on South Africa, but argues (as in the 
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case of damage to black workers in South Africa itself) that this is the price 
of ending apartheid}6 
Before concluding this section it should be noted that there is one major 
restraining factor on the Church's support for economic pressure against 
South Africa. Specifically, it feels that in formulating policy on South Africa 
it should take into account the views of the South African Catholic Church. 
The South African Catholic Church has long been opposed to apartheid. In 
1957, South Africa's Catholic bishops characterized apartheid as "something 
intrinsically evil."17 At the same time, however, the bishops have mixed 
feelings about economic sanctions. On the one hand, they acknowledge that 
without some form of pressure there will be no reforms in the apartheid 
system. As Bishop Wilfred Napier, president of the Southern African Catholic 
Bishop's Conference, stated in May 1987: 
For all the criticisms of the SACBC stand on economic 
pressures, we wonder if anything would have been done to 
move away from the odious system of apartheid if it had 
not been for such pressures. Sadly people only seem to 
respond to pressure and this has had the positive result of 
creating a greater awareness of the position in South Africa 
by those who might otherwise have been content to allow 
matters to continue. A climate for response has developed, 
which was not present before.18 
So the South African Catholic Church clearly feels that economic pressure is 
one way to cause reforms in the apartheid system. At the same time, 
however, the South African Church is concerned that economic pressure, 
carried too far, could result in an economic "wasteland" in South Africa that 
would benefit no one. As the South African bishops stated in May 1986: 
We, ourselves, believe that economic pressure has been 
justifiably imposed to end apartheid. Moreover, we believe 
that such pressure should continue and, if necessary, be 
intensified should the developments just referred to show 
little hope of fundamental change. However, we do not need 
to point out that, in our view, intensified pressure can only 
be justified if applied in such a way as not to destroy the 
country's economy and to reduce, as far as possible, any 
additional suffering to the oppressed through job loss. At 
the moment, we can see no justification for the sort of 
pressure that would leave a liberated South Africa in an 
economically nonviable situation.19 
In addition to their concerns that sanctions might wreck the South 
African economy, the bishops are skeptical that sanctions alone will move 
South Africa away from apartheid. As a report commissioned by the South 
African Bishop's Conference put it 
As anticipated, the whole issue of economic pressures has 
clearly had a totally counterproductive effect on government 
thinking. The whole sanctions issue has consolidated 
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Government in its retreat from meaningful, and indeed any, 
reform.20 
Inasmuch as the South African Catholic Church and the American 
Catholic Church are branches of the universal Roman Catholic Church, the 
leaders of these two national Churches have had considerable personal contact 
with each other through Church councils, such as Vatican II, and through the 
bishops' synods that convene in Rome every few years. Historically, the 
American Catholics have been reluctant to urge policies with respect to a 
foreign country unless these policies have the approval of the local Church. 
Consequently, in South Africa's case, the U.S. Church has been less radical 
in its policy recommendations than have been such largely Protestant bodies 
as the National Council of Churches and the World Council of Churches. 
An Evaluation of the Policy of the American Catholic Church 
Toward South Africa 
Given the terrible moral costs that the apartheid system imposes on 
oppressor and oppressed in South Africa, it is not surprising that the U.S. 
Catholic Church has been so concerned about the need to restructure South 
Africa's political, economic and social institutions with the ultimate goal of a 
multiracial democratic society. A Church claiming allegiance to Christian 
ideas could hardly do otherwise. 
The problem with the position of the American Church is not that its 
moral concern is misplaced, but rather that it fails to understand some 
fundamental aspects of politics in democratic societies. Specifically, the 
Church overlooks the following three issues: first, for a democratic political 
system to survive there must be some degree of economic prosperity; second, 
for democratic reform to work it is necessary that there be adequate time and 
that political order be maintained; and third, democracy in multi-racial, multi-
religious and/or multi-ethnic societies operates on different principles from 
democracy in homogeneous societies. 
Looking at the first issue, mere are numerous examples of how economic 
collapse can lead to a breakdown of democratic institutions. In the case of the 
Weimar Republic (1918-1933) two key reasons for its demise were the 
massive inflation of 1922-1923 (where in the course of less than a year the 
value of a German Mark went from four to a dollar to several trillion to a 
dollar) and the Great Depression of 1929-1933 (where by 1932 unemployment 
in Germany was 42%).21 The Allende government in Chile (1970-1973) fell 
to a considerable degree because it badly mismanaged the Chilean economy (at 
the time of the 1973 coup inflation in Chile was running at 400% a year and 
there were shortages of all sorts of essential items).22 The Uruguayan coup of 
1973 was brought on in large part because of the failure of the civilian 
leadership to revive an economy that had been stagnant since the mid-1950s.23 
And one of the key reasons for the downfall of the Nigerian Second Republic 
(1979-1983) was the perception on the part of the Nigerian population that 
the government was incapable of managing the economy. (In the four years of 
civilian rule foreign currency reserves declined from $8 billion to less than $1 
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billion; external debt climbed from roughly $4 billion to $15 billion; and 
both unemployment and inflation registered sharp increases under civilian 
rule.)24 
It is of course true that economic disasters do not automatically bring 
down democratic governments. The United States survived the Great 
Depression, and Great Britain endured the quite difficult economic conditions 
present immediately after World War II. So by itself economic hardship will 
not invariably destroy democratic institutions. But there can be no doubt that 
economic calamities put a strain on democratic systems. When combined 
with other problems (such as the collapse of political order, poor leadership, a 
lost war), economic crisises can bring down democratic governments. 
Given that some degree of economic prosperity is important for 
establishing and maintaining democratic governments, one can see the 
dubiousness of the idea that by trying to damage the South African economy 
one will promote the development of a multi-racial democracy. As the South 
African bishops realize, destroying the South African economy is most 
unlikely to promote the goal of a democratic South Africa. What the U.S. 
Catholic Church must realize is that the history of the development of 
democratic regimes shows conclusively that democracies thrive under 
conditions of economic prosperity, and that consequently it is very doubtful 
that a genuinely democratic South Africa would emerge from a severely 
economically depressed South Africa. 
The second requirement that democratic societies need to survive is the 
ability to maintain political order. The Twentieth Century offers many 
examples of democratic societies that collapsed and were replaced by 
dictatorships because they could not maintain law and order. In the case of the 
Weimar Republic, the government lost popular support not only because of 
economic disasters, but also because of a collapse of public order; by 1932-
1933 the German population saw daily street battles between the different 
private armies of the various political factions.25 The final year of the Allende 
government in Chile witnessed considerable violence between right-wing and 
left-wing extremists.26 In Uruguay a key factor in discrediting civilian rule 
was the government's inability to defeat the Tupamaro urban guerrillas; 
consequently in the spring of 1972 the Uruguayan government gave the 
military a "blank cheque" to crush the Tupamaros (which the military did in a 
brutal campaign of a few months).27 And, in addition to the economic causes 
of its collapse, another factor that helped bring down the Nigerian Second 
Republic was its inability to control political violence. The 1983 elections in 
Nigeria were marked by clashes between parties and party factions in which 
hundreds were killed and thousands were injured. This high level of violence 
was one of the main reasons for disaffection with civilian rule.28 
Critics of the argument that order and democracy are linked could identify 
examples where revolutionary violence has led to democracy. One can point 
to the English Civil War, the American Revolution, the French Revolution 
and the American Civil War as cases that arguably resulted in victories for 
democracy. So, following from these examples, a case could be made that a 
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revolution in South Africa would not necessarily have an anti-democratic 
outcome. 
However, a closer look at these examples, plus a consideration of other 
cases, casts considerable doubt on the idea that revolutionary upheaval would 
lead to democracy in South Africa. First, in the cases cited it must be 
remembered that the immediate outcome of three of these four cases was a 
military dictatorship: Cromwell in England, Napoleon in France, and the 
U.S. Army in the South. Second, these cases were all pre-Twentieth Century. 
In this century violent revolutions have seldom if ever had democratic 
outcomes: the Russian, Chinese, Cuban, Vietnamese and Cambodian 
revolutions produced totalitarian regimes; the Iranian revolution led to a 
theocracy; and the Mexican revolution produced a one-party authoritarian 
system. Third, Twentieth Century cases such as the Irish rebellion of 1916-
1922 and the Israeli struggle for their homeland in 1945-1948 were not social 
revolutions; they were "wars of national liberation," in which one portion of 
a political system (the Irish Republic, Israel) seceded from the rest of the 
political system (the British Empire). 
For any democratic society the question of dealing with political violence 
poses major ethical dilemmas. These societies pride themselves, quite rightly, 
on their legal systems, which respect minority opinions and provide for 
elaborate protections for individuals accused of crimes. Yet it is this very 
system of respect for diversity and for the rule of law that can make 
democracies vulnerable to attack by terrorists and political extremists. In 
many cases in recent years terrorists and political extremists have taken 
advantage of the legal safeguards of democratic states to wage war against 
these societies. For example, the Tupamaro urban guerrillas were able to 
operate effectively in Uruguay in large part because Uruguay was a democratic 
society with a long-standing respect for civil liberties and rule of law.29 And 
the high incidence of both right-wing and left-wing violence in Italy in recent 
decades has been in large part due to the fact that Italy is a democratic nation 
that respects human rights.30 
Consequently, all democratic societies have emergency legislation that 
can be invoked to deal with a crisis. The U.S. Constitution provides that the 
writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in times of "Rebellion or 
Invasion."31 During the Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln used this 
clause of the Constitution to arrest and imprison many people. In 1871, the 
U.S. Congress passed the Ku Klux Klan Act, which gave the President 
sweeping powers to use the U.S. military to control domestic terrorism. 
Canada used the War Measures Act, which Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau 
invoked in 1970, to deal with terrorism in Quebec generated by the Front for 
the Liberation of Quebec (FLQ). 
In South Africa's case, the question of political order and democracy 
raises some acute moral dilemmas. The U.S. Catholic Church has opposed 
draconian security legislation of the South African state that provides for such 
measures as imprisonment without trial, banning and the death penalty. Since 
the outbreak of unrest in 1984, the American Church and its South African 
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counterpart have been concerned about police and security force violence. A 
document of the United States Catholic Conference on the South African 
situation included the following quotation from South Africa's bishops: 
And we say now, as long as the system of apartheid 
prevails, the resentment and unrest will never die down. In 
our report on police conduct during township protest, in 
December 1984, and in our statement of March 22 on the 
Langa tragedy, we deplored the unnecessary force and 
violence used the police.32 
So there is ample cause on Christian grounds for the American Catholic 
Church to be concerned about the way South Africa deals with political 
violence. However, there is in the South African case a failure by the Church 
to recognize the implications of political violence for the development of 
democratic institutions. Specifically, it fails to understand that its goal of a 
democratic multi-racial South Africa can be achieved only if there is some 
minimum degree of political order in South Africa. If violence is corrosive to 
democratic institutions, then continued political violence in South Africa will 
not offer an environment in which democracy can emerge. What it could 
produce is the triumph of the hard right Conservative Party in the next 
election; an accelerated political radicalization of the black community; and/or 
a military coup. 
In sum, the American Catholic Church must realize that in South 
Africa's case, as in all countries, order and democracy are inextricably linked. 
The existence of such a linkage does not require the Church to stop protesting 
against the draconian emergency legislation of the South African state. What 
it requires is that the Church recognize the need for order in South Africa as a 
prerequisite for the emergence of a genuinely democratic system in that 
country. 
Before concluding discussion on this issue, it may be instructive to recall 
another time when the American Catholic Church was forced to deal with the 
question of order and democracy. During the 1960s in American society there 
was considerable urban violence due to black discontent and to student 
radicalism. Many people in the Church were reluctant to condemn this 
violence because they felt that those causing the turmoil had just grievances 
(racism and the war in Vietnam).33 What these Church figures failed to realize 
was that this violence was having a corrosive effect on America's democratic 
institutions. The U.S. Catholic Church can learn something from the 
turbulent 1960s as it seeks to formulate a South Africa policy; no matter how 
just the demands of an aggrieved group may appear, tolerating violence by the 
group in question will only endanger the survival or the emergence of 
democratic institutions. 
The second major failure of understanding is that the U.S. Church does 
not comprehend what is needed to institute democratic reforms. Specifically, 
it does not appreciate that in moving toward democratic institutions there is a 
need for both time and order, as mentioned above. 
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On the matter of time, it is worth recalling that democratic institutions 
have nowhere emerged overnight. As was noted above, political revolutions 
seldom result in democratic governments; almost invariably the outcome of 
revolutions is dictatorial government How much time is required varies from 
case to case. For example, in Brazil in 1964, a military coup overthrew the 
democratic government. The process of returning Brazil to democracy began 
in the early 1970s, when the military relaxed some of the controls it had 
established over society. But it was not until 1985 that Brazil inaugurated a 
civilian president.34 In Nigeria, the military overthrew the First Republic in 
1966. This coup set in motion the events that led to Biafra's 1967 secession; 
the civil war brought about by this secession lasted until 1971. Shortly 
thereafter, the military indicated its plans to eventually return to civilian rule; 
but it was not until 1979 that a civilian government took over power from 
the military.35 
The U.S. Catholic Church has called for an immediate end to apartheid 
and the establishment of a new South Africa.36 Out of an understandable 
revulsion against the apartheid system, it has not understood that the only 
way a new South Africa can be built is through a process of reform that will 
take at least several years. Hastening the process may actually prevent a 
democratic outcome. 
As noted earlier, another prerequisite for democratic reform is some 
minimal degree of political order. Political writers since Tocqueville have 
commented on how, when a political regime begins to change, often the 
result is a desire on the part of the population for an immediate end to all of 
the regime's injustices. Such utopianism can lead to a complete breakdown of 
order in society. A society that lacks a minimal degree of political order 
cannot undertake democratic reforms. For example, Brazil's return to 
democracy was possible because the Brazilian military by the early 1970s had 
totally crushed the rural and urban guerrilla groups. With these guerrilla 
movements destroyed order was ensured, which made possible the cautious 
process of redemocratization of 1974-1985. 
In South Africa's case, even before de Klerk's recent initiatives, the Botha 
government's reforms had raised expectations and hopes of an immediate end 
to apartheid among South Africa's non-white communities. If these raised 
expectations result in the breakdown of order the upshot will be the end of the 
democratic reform process and a civil war, or the imposition of an 
authoritarian government interested only in the restoration of order. 
In trying to formulate a South African policy (as well as a policy on 
other countries undergoing political disorder), the American Catholic Church 
should keep in mind the aphorism of the Protestant theologian Reinhold 
Neibuhr: "A situation without order means chaos and is therefore bad. An 
order without justice means that it will become intolerable in the long run."37 
Order and justice are inextricably linked; in a society in turmoil such as South 
Africa the only hope for justice is that a minimal degree of order can be 
maintained. 
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The third failure of the U.S. Catholic Church is its inability to grasp that 
in societies with deep racial, religious and/or ethnic cleavages democracy 
must, of necessity, function quite differently from the way it does in 
relatively homogeneous societies like the United States, Great Britain, and 
Western Europe. Specifically, there are two major dangers that ethnically, 
religiously and/or racially divided societies face in their efforts to achieve 
stable democratic government: civil war and majority tyranny. 
In contemporary Africa, there are many examples of countries that are 
either currently going through a civil war or have suffered one in the recent 
past. Such conflicts invariably complicate the task of establishing and 
preserving democratic institutions. In the Sudan a bloody North-South 
conflict has hampered the reintroduction of democracy. In Uganda, the effort 
to reestablish democracy after Idi Amin's downfall in 1979 was unsuccessful 
because of large-scale violence between the various tribal groups and political 
factions. 
All democratic countries run the risk of civil war; after all, even a well-
established and institutionalized democratic system like the United States had 
a terrible civil war between 1861 and 1865. But for ethnically, racially and/or 
religiously divided societies the dangers of civil war are particularly acute 
because of the deep social cleavages that are present in these societies. 
In segmented societies there is also a risk of majority tyranny. 
Specifically, in these societies there is always the threat of the majority 
ethnic, racial and/or religious group setting itself up as the "permanent 
majority" by encouraging all members of the group to vote for it. This, in 
essence, is what has happened in Zimbabwe since that country became 
independent in 1980. Robert Mugabe's ZANU (Zimbabwe African National 
Union) is based on the Shona tribe, which constitutes about two-thirds of the 
country's population. Almost all Shonas vote for ZANU, giving it a 
permanent majority in parliament. The minority Ndebele tribe, which 
supports Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People's Union), is thus 
a "permanent minority." The Ndebeles have accused Mugabe's government of 
considerable persecution and discrimination in the years since independence. 
Majority tyranny is a problem for any democratic society. The founding 
fathers of the American Republic were well aware of the hazards of majority 
tyranny, which is why they established a Senate not elected by popular vote 
and set up a complicated system of checks and balances whereby different 
branches of government would prevent each other from becoming too 
powerful. But in ethnically, racially and/or religiously divided societies 
majority tyranny is a particularly acute danger because voters quite often tend 
to automatically support their own members for office rather than (as in more 
homogeneous societies) shift their votes among parties and individuals based 
on the issues and personalties of the campaign. It should be noted in passing 
that the U.S. Catholic Church has always been keenly aware of the threat of 
majority tyranny, specifically, the risk that the Protestant majority in the 
United States would act tyrannically toward the Catholic minority. 
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Consequently, in its history American Catholics have always been strongly 
in favor of minority rights.38 
Because of these dangers, democracy, if it is to work at all in ethnically, 
racially and/or religiously divided societies, must function according to the 
principles of what Arend Lijphart calls "consociational democracy."39 Since 
Lijphart's book on Dutch politics (The Politics of Accommodation) was 
published in 1968, there has been a great deal written about consociational 
democracy and how it differs from more conventional interpretations of 
democracy. In brief, the basic principles of consociational democracy are: 
executive power-sharing among the representatives of all significant groups, a 
high degree of internal autonomy for groups that wish to have it, proportional 
representation and proportional allocation of civil service positions and public 
funds, and a minority veto on the most vital issues.40 
Even this brief sketch of how consociational democracy functions shows 
that it is quite different from the republican or Westminster style of 
democracy. Because divided societies are more fragile than homogenous states, 
they tend to have the sort of democratic system that puts a great deal of 
emphasis on consensus and tries very hard to avoid conflict. 
Looking at South Africa in this light, it is clear that South Africa's only 
chance for a democratic system is some sort of consociational system. South 
Africa is a diverse country in terms of race, ethnicity and religion. The white 
community is split linguistically between Afrikaans and English speakers. 
Religiously, the people of South Africa are divided among a number of 
Christian Churches (Dutch Reformed, Anglican, Evangelical, mainstream 
Protestant), a sizeable Jewish community, Muslims and Hindus. Racially it 
is divided among whites, blacks, Asians and Coloureds. The black 
community is separated ethnically among a number of tribes, and religiously 
among several churches.41 It has been correctly noted that the architects of the 
apartheid system sought to reinforce tribal loyalties to keep the black 
population segmented. However, the corollary that is sometimes drawn from 
this charge, namely that the tribal loyalties in South Africa are artificial, is 
most clearly not true. The whole history of post-independence Africa has 
shown the enduring significance of tribal loyalties. Based on the experience of 
other divided countries imposing a Westminster or republican system in 
South Africa probably would result in either civil war or majority tyranny.42 
The U.S. Catholic Church has, unfortunately, not understood this. 
Instead, it has tended to urge the creation of democratic systems based on 
"western" models. Such majoritarian systems are unacceptable to both the 
white and the non-white populations of South Africa. They are unacceptable 
to the whites because under a majoritarian system the white minority would 
be totally frozen out of power. Equally important, majoritarian democracy 
goes against African traditions of resolving issues by debate among the elders 
until consensus is reached. As Chief Buthelezi has said: "The competitive 
Westminster system (is) incompatible with African traditions."43 So what the 
U.S. Church needs to do is "broaden its horizons" and start looking at some 
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other possible models (such as the Netherlands and Switzerland) for 
democratic reform in South Africa. 
Conclusion 
This article recognizes that in dealing with South Africa the American 
Catholic Church is motivated by a quite sincere revulsion at the injustices of 
the apartheid system. But, as is so often the case in politics, good intentions 
and sincere motivation are not enough to produce a constructive outcome. 
Specifically, on the South Africa issue the Church has failed to recognize that 
in an explosive situation like South Africa the claims of justice must be 
balanced against the claims of order. If these two sets of claims are not 
balanced against each other the result will be a terrible civil war in which all 
of the people of South Africa will be the losers. 
It has also failed to appreciate the complexity of democratic systems. 
These systems require certain preconditions if they are to be created and to 
survive; can best undertake reform by evolution; and often have to be greatly 
modified in order to fit the social, economic and political conditions of the 
society in which they emerge. The American Catholic Church has not 
comprehended the complex and diverse nature of democratic systems, and 
consequently has called for unrealistic and Utopian measures to introduce 
democracy into South Africa. 
In sum, in formulating policy toward troubled countries like South 
Africa, the U.S. Catholic Church would do well to remember another one of 
Neibuhr's maxim's: "Goodness, armed with power, is corrupted; and pure love 
without power is destroyed."** Put differently, in the context of South Africa, 
being concerned about the moral issues is not enough. The U.S. Church must 
be prepared to "arm goodness with power" (even if it means abandoning some 
of its moral purity) by taking a sober, realistic look at both the political and 
moral dilemmas that countries like South Africa face. 
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